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This is the second of a two-part article on the law of
confessions. The first part discussed evidentiary issues,
the due process voluntariness test, and several Miranda
issues. This article completes the discussion of Miranda,
commencing with the issue of waiver. It also examines
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the derivative
evidence rule.
Waiver
Like most constitutional rights, the Fifth Amendment
can be waived. In Miranda the Court wrote: "An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer.
While such request affirmatively secures his right to have
one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a
waiver. No effective waiver of the right to counsel during
interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made
after the warnings we here delineate have been given."
384 U.S. at 470. The Court went on to state: "But a valid
waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of
the accused after warnings are given or simply from the
fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained." /d.
at 475.
The Court provided further guidance on the waiver
issue in North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979).
Butler was arrested by the FBI in New York for crimes
committed in North Carolina. After being read his Miranda rights by the arresting agent, Butler refused to sign a
waiver form but nonetheless made an incriminating
statement. The Court found a valid waiver, noting that the
defendant had stated: "I will talk to you but I am not signing any form." Although it upheld the conviction, the
Court again emphasized the heavy burden the prosecution must bear in establishing a valid Waiver:
An express written or oral statement of waiver of the right
to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong
proof of the validity of that waiver, but it is not inevitably
either necessary or sufficient to establish waiver. The question is not one of form, but rather whether the defendant in
fact knowingly and voluntarily waived the rights delineated
in the Miranda case. As was unequivocally said in Miranda,
mere silence is not enough. That does not mean that the
defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his
rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver, may never
support a conclusion that a defendant has waived his rights.
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The courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his
rights; the prosecution's burden is great; but in at least some
cases waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and
words of the person interrogated. /d. at 373.
The Court also considered a waiver issue in Tague v.
Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469 (1980) (per curiam). In that case
the officer who obtained the confession testified that he
read the Miranda rights from a card but could not remember what those rights were or whether he had asked the
defendant if he understood the rights as read. The Court
reversed: "In this case no evidence at all was introduced
to prove that petitioner knowingly and intelligently waived
his rights before making the inculpatory statement. The
statement was therefore inadmissible." /d. at 471.
Multiple Interrogations
One type of waiver issue has produced much litigation.
The issue is: Under what circumstances may a suspect
who has previously invoked his Miranda rights waive
those rights in a susbsequent interrogation? The Court's
cases on this issue indicate that the answer to this question depends on whether the defendant claims only the
right to remain silent or also claims the right to an attorney.

Right to Silence
The first case decided by the Court on this issue was
Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). Mosley was read
his Miranda rights after being arrested for robbery. At that
time he indicated that he did not want to answer questions and the interrogation ceased. Subsequently, a second police officer questioned him about a homicide.
Again Miranda warnings were read. According to the
Court, Miranda requires the police to "scrupulously honor" a defendant's decision to remain silent. In the Court's
view, the conduct of the police in Mosley satisfied that
standard:
This is not a case ... where the police failed to honor a decision of a person in custody to cut off questioning, either by
refusing to discontinue the interrogation upon request or by
persisting in repeated efforts to wear down his resistance
and make him change his mind. In contrast to such prac, tices, the police here immediately ceased the interrogation,
resumed questioning only after the passage of a significant
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perioifoftimerana tneproVision'·of ·a=frEistrset-otwarnings,
and restricted the second interrogation to a crime that had
not been a s_llbject of the earliefinterrogation./d. at 105-06.

four-Justice plurality coupled with Justice Powell's
concurrence was enough to doom Bradshaw's appeal.
Last term, the Court decided a somewhat different
issue concerning the applicability of Edwards. In Smith v.
Illinois, 105 S. Ct. 490 (1984), after being informed of his
right to counsel, the defendant replied, "Uh, yeah. I'd like
to do that." When asked whether he would be willing to
talk without counsel, he said, "Yeah and no, wh, I don't
know what's what, really." Nevertheless, he went on to
make incriminating statements. On review, the Court held
the statements inadmissible. Smith dealt with the thresholdq[J{?§tio!l under £dwards- whether the right to counsel had been asserted. The Court found that the initial
assertion of the right to counsel was unambiguous and
the defendant's subsequent conduct could not be used
to make the assertion ambiguous. "[A]n accused's postrequest responses to further interrogation may not be
used to cast doubt on the clarity of this initial request for
counsel." /d. at 491.

One difficulty with Mosley concerns its applicability under somewhat different circumstances; The Court emphasized several factors: the second interrogation
involved a differ~nt crime, was conducted by a different
officer, and occurred after a lapse of time (2 hours). It is
unclear hbvit the Court would have decided the issue had
one of these factors differed.

Right to Counsel
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), presented the
Court with the right to counsel issue absent in Mosley.
Mosely asserted only the right to remain silent At some

point in the_ initial interrogation, EdvJards asserted the
right to counsel. The questioning ceased and Edwards
was taken to a jail cell. The following morning two detectives visited him, stating that they wanted to talk. They
read Edwards his Miranda rights again, Edwards subsequently confessed. The Supreme Court reversed.
Instead of appfying the Mosley analysis, the Court adopted a different approach:

A related issue concerning the assertion of the right to
counsel was raised in United States v. Porter, 764 F.2d 1
(1st Cir. 1985). In tha:t case the court held that an unsuccessful telephone call to an attorney invoked the right to
counsel. According to the court, a DEA agent who was
present at the time the call was made should have informed the interrogating officer of the call. /d. at 6-7.

"[A]n accused ... having expressed his desire to deal with
the police only through counsel, is not subjecno further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made
available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further
communication, exchanges, or conversations with the
police." /d. at 484-85 (emphasis added).

Misdemeanor Exception
On several occasions the Court has been asked to
recognize exceptions to Miranda. For example, a number
of lower courts had held that Miranda warnings were not
required for misdemeanor offenses. See State v. Pyle, 19
Ohio St.2d 64, 68, 249 N.E.2d 826, 828 (1969) ("We hold
that the ruling in Miranda ... is not applicable to misdemeanors ...."), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1007 (1970). In
Berkemer v. McCarty, 104 S.Ct. 3138 (1984), the Court
refused to accept such an exception: Miranda does not
depend on "the nature or severity of the offense of which
he is suspected or for which he was arrested." /d. at 3148.
According to the Court, such an exception would create
numerous difficulties for the police. The police often are
unaware when they arrest a person whether he may have
committed a misdemeanor or felony. Moreover, investigations into seemingly minor offenses sometimes escalate gradually into investigations into more serious matters. See also State v. Buchholz, 11 Ohio St.3d 24, 462
N.E.2d 1222 (1984) (overruling Pyle); 14 Cap. U. L. Rev.
127 (1985). However, as McCarty makes clear, there is
often no custody in this context and for that reason,
Miranda is inapplicable.

Several later cases clarified the Edwards rule. In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 (1982) (per curiam), the accused requested a polygraph test after receiving Miranda
warnings. According to the Court this request satisfied
the Edwards initiation requirement and his waiver encompassedpost-test questioning as well as the questions askedwhile-attached tothepalygraph,
_Despite Edwards and Wyrick, the lower courts remained divided over the relationship between the initiation requirement and the waiver requirement. Some
courts treated them as distinct requirements, while other
courts viewed "initiation" as only one factor in determining waiver. The Supreme Court resolved this conflict in
Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983). Soon after
asserting his right to counsel, Bradshaw asked, "Well,
what is going to happen to me now?" A conversation followed in which Bradshaw agreed to take a polygraph
test. At the conclusion of the test, he made an incriminatory statem.E:)nt. The plurality opinion took the position
that Edwards requires a two-step analysis: (1) did the
defendant initiate the communication, and (2) did he
waive his Mirarida rights. These inquiries are distinct and
both "initiafion"andwaivei" are required asa prerequisite to the admission of the statement. On this issue, the
dissenting Justices concurred and thus a majority of the
Court_ agreed on this two-step approach.
Nevertheless, Bradshaw lost his appeal because the
plurality believed that his statement ("Well, what is going
to happen to me now?") satisfied the initiation prong.
Although the plurality acknowledged that some statements such as those requesting a drink of water or the
use of a telephone would not constitute "initiation," Bradshaw's question, though ambiguous, "evinced a willingness and a desire for a generalized discussion about the
investigation." /d. at 1045-46. This view of facts by the

Public Safety Exception
In New York v. Quarles, 104 S.Ct. 2626 (1984), the Supreme Court considered a public safety exception to
Miranda. The defendant in Quarles was arrested soon
after the police were informed by a rape victim that a man
fitting his description had attacked her. The complaint
included the fact that the rapist had a gun. At the time of
his arrest, the defendant was wearing an empty shoulder
holster. After handcuffing the defendant, the arresting officer asked where the gun was and the defendant
responded, "The gun is over there."
On review, the Supreme Court recognized for the first
time a public safety exception to Miranda: "We hold that
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on these facts there is a 'public safety' exception to
[Miranda), and that the availability of that exception does
not depend upon the motivation of the individual officers
involved." /d. at 2632. According to the Court, "So long
as the gun was concealed somewhere in the supermarket, with its actual whereabouts unknown, it obviously
posed more than one danger to the public safety: an
accomplice might make use of it, a customer or employee might later come upon it." /d. at 2632. The Court went
on to hold that in such a situation the threat to the public
safety outweighed the need for Miranda's prophylactic
rule protecting the Fifth Amendment.

The Court also considered the impeachment issue in
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), and reached the
same conclusion.
Several courts have considered whether the impeachment exception recognized by Harris applies to witnesses other than the defendant. These attempts to extend
Harris have failed. In United States v. Hinckley, 672 F.2d
115 (D.C. Cir. 1982), the prosecution wanted to impeach
defense psychiatrists with the defendant's illegally obtained statements in order to rebut an insanity defense.
The court rejected such use:
· · Were we to curtail the exclusionary rule in the drastic manner the government urges, we would provide little or no
deterrence of constitutional violations against defendants
whose sanity is the principal issue in the case. The government would be able, under the guise of rebuttal, to use any
illegally obtained evidence relevant to the principal issue in
the case:..__ insanity./d. at134.

Although the Court labeled the public safety exception
a "narrow exception," it failed to provide much guidance
on its applicability. Despite the Court's assertions, there

vvas no eyidence of an accomplice, nor 'IJas there any evidence that the police could not have "sealed off" the
area and searched for the weapon. The need for the exception, at least under the facts of the case, does not
seem compelling. A far more persuasive argument for an
exception is present in what has come to be known as
the "rescue doctrine" cases, in which some courts had
recognized an exception to Miranda where a defendant is
questioned about the whereabouts of a kidnapping victim. See 1 W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure
508-09 (1984).

See also State v. Burnett, 637 S.W.2d 680, 689-90 (Mo.
1982) (illegally seized evidence cannot be used to impeach defense witnesses); State v. Hubbard, 103
Wash.2_d 570, 693 P.2d 718, 722 (1985).
The impeachment exception applies only to statements obtained in violation of Miranda. As noted earlier, it
does not apply to statements obtained in violation of the
due process voluntariness test. Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978). Nordoes it apply to statements obtained
in violation of the right to counsel. See infra.

Few cases have applied this new exception. People v.
Cole, 165 Cal. App.3d 41,211 Cal. Rptr. 242 (1985), was
one of the first cases. The court, applying Quarles, held
that an inquiry about a stolen kitchen knife comes within
the public safety exception. In contrast, the court in
People v. Roundtree, 125111. App.3d 1075, 482 N.E.2d
593 (1985), found the exception inapplicable where the
jefendants were all handcuffed and the scene was se::ured by the police. See also Comment, New York v.
Quarles: The Public Safety Exception to Miranda, 70 Iowa
L. Rev. 1075 (1985); 26 Ariz. L.J. 967 (1984); 23 Duq. L.
Rev. 805 (1985); 36 Mercer L. Rev. 1059 (1985); 19 U.
Rich. L. Rev. 193 (1984); 87 W.Va. L. Rev. 381 (1985).

Silence
The Court has refused to extend the impeachment
exception to situations in which a suspect remains silent
after receiving Miranda warnings. In Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610 (1976), the Court wrote:
Silence in the wake of [Miranda} warnings may be nothing
more than the arrestee's exercise of [his] Miranda rights.
Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous
because of what the State is required to advise the person
arrested .... Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no
penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to
allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an
explanation subsequently offered at triaL/d. at 617-18.

Impeachment Exception
In Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), the defenjantdenied on direct examination that he knew the nature of the substance that he had sold to an undercover
officer. According to his testimony, he was attempting to
jefraud the officer by selling him baking powder. On cross3Xamination, the prosecutor questioned him about incrimnating statements he had made at the time of arrest. The
orosecution conceded that the statements had been ob:ained in violation of Miranda because the defendant had
1ot been warned of his right to appointed counsel.

The Court's reasoning is critical. Although the circumstances implicate Miranda, the Court did not rely on the
Fifth Amendment. Doyle is a due process case. The centerpiece of the Court's analysis is an estoppel theory; the
prosecution should be estopped from using a defendant's silence as evidence of guilt when the police induced that silence by giving the Miranda warnings. It is
this aspect of Doyle that explains the Court's later cases.

On review, the Supreme Court upheld the impeach1lent use of the statements:

In Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404 (1980) (per curiam), the defendant did not remain silent after receiving
Miranda warnings. Consequently, there was no governmental inducement to remain silent: "But Doyle does not
apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into prior
inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes no
unfair use of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings has not been
induced to remain silent. As to the subject matter of his
statements, the defendant has not remained silent at all."
!d. at 408.

Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his own
defense, or to refuse to do so. But that privilege cannot be
construed to include the right to commit perjury .... Having
voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution
here did no more than utilize the traditional truth-testing
devices of the adversary process ....
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a
license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk
of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances. /d. at
225-26.
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Jenkins-v."Anderson, 447 U.S. 231·· (-1980); involved a
case of pre-arrest silence. The defendant surrendered
two weeks after he killed someone. When he testified
that he had killed in self-defense, the prosecution questioned him about his delay in surrendering and
commented in closing argument that the defendant
"waited two weeks, according to the testimony- at least
two weeks before he did anything about surrendering
himself or reporting [the stabbing] to anybody." /d. at 234.
Again, the Court relied on Doyle's inducement theory in
holding that evidence of silence was admissible: "[N]o
governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent
before arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the
petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda
warni~gs. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness
present in Doyle is not present in this case." !d. at 240.
Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982), involved postarrest silence. However, no warnings were given. Here,
too, the inducement theory proved critical: "In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in
the Miranda warnings, we do not believe that it violates
due process of law for a State to permit cross-examination as to postarrest silence when a defendant chooses
to take the stand." /d. at 607.
Recently, the Court considered another Doyle issue. In
Wainwright v. Greenfield, 106 S.Ct. 634 (1986), the prosecutor used the defendant's post-Miranda warnings silence as substantive evidence of the defendant's sanity.
The Court found that Doyle controlled and reversed. The
Court commented:
The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally

than in courts or other official investigations, where there are
often impartial observers to guard against intimidation or
trickery." /d. at 576.

Juvenile Cases
Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), involved the applicability of Miranda in juvenile court proceedings. The
Court's holding in the case was narrow. The Court held
only that a juvenile's request to speak with his probation
officer, after receiving Miranda warnings, was not a per
se invocation of the right to remain silent. In a footnote ,
however, the Court raised a question about the application of Miranda in this context:
[T)his Court has f1Qt yet held that Miranda applies with full
force to exclude,evidemce obtained in violation of its proscriptions from consideration in juvenile proceedings, which
for certain puq)oseshave been distinguished from formal
criminal prosecutions .... We do not decide that issue
today. In view of our disposition of this case, we assume
without deciding that the Miranda principles were fully applicable to the present proceedings. /d. at 717 n.4.

Most lower courts, however, have applied Miranda to juvenile cases. See In re Dennis M., 70 Cal.2d 444, 450
P.2d 296, 75 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969); In re A.A. H., 314 A.2d
133 (D.C. 1974); State v. Whatley, 320 So.2d 123 (La ..
1975); State v. Loyd, 297 Minn. 442, 212 N.W.2d 671
(1973); In re Robert 0., 109 N.Y. Misc.2d 238, 439 N.Y.S.2d
994 (Fam. Ct. 1981). See also W. Kurtz & P. Giannelli,
Ohio Juvenile Law ch. 5 (1985).

Death Penalty Hearings
In one situation, the Court did extend Miranda. In
Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), the prosecution introduced expert psyc:hiatric testimony on the issue of the
defendant's future dangerousness during a death penalty hearing. The testimony was based on an interview with
the defendant, which had been conducted by the state's
expert. The Court ruled that Miranda warnings were required under these facts:

unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not
be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise
by using silence to Impeach his trial testimony. It is equally
unfair to breach.that promise by using silence to overcome a
defendant's plea of insanity./d: ·at 639.

Other Proceedings
In several cases the Court has considered the applicability of Miranda to proceedings other than trial.

The consideration [articulated in Miranda) calling for the
accused to be warned prior to custodial interrogatio'n apply
with no less force to the pretrial psychiatric examination at
issue here. Respondent was [in jail) when the examination
was ordered and when it was conducted .... When Dr. Grigson went beyond simply reporting to the Court on the issue.
of competence and testified for the prosecution at the penalty phase on the crucial issue of respondent's future de~nger
ousness, his role changed and became essentially like that
of an agent of the State recounting unwarned statements
made in a postarrest custodial setting. /d. at 467.

Prison Disciplinary Hearings
In Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976), the Court
refused to apply Miranda to prison disciplinary proceedings in which the charged conduct also constituted a
crime under state law: "The Court has never held, and
we decline to do so now, that the requirements of [Miranda) must be met to render pretrial statements admissible
in other than criminal cases." /d. at 315.

Grand Jury Proceedings

!!

State Constitutional Law

In United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976), a
plurality of the Court stated that Miranda warnings were
not required when a grand jury witness is questioned
about criminal conduct in which the witness may have
been involved. The plurality viewed the grand jury process as fundamentally different from the police interrogation process:

Even though the U.S. Supreme Court may limit the
reach of Miranda under the federal Constitution, a state
may provide greater protection to a defendant under the
self-incrimination clause of a state constitution. The Supreme Court has recognized this principle in a number of
its confession cases. For example, in Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714 (1975), the Court wrote: "[A] state is free as a
matter of its own Jaw to impose greater restrictions on
police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitutional standards." /d at 719.
See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the
Protection of Individual Rights, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 1324
(1982); Sedler, The State Constitutional Law in Ohio and
the Nation, 16 U. Tol. L. Rev. 391 (1985).

[The Miranda] warnings were aimed at the evils seen by the
Court as endemic to police interrogation of a person in
custody. Miranda addressed extrajudicial confessions or
admissions procured in a hostile, unfamiliar environment
which lacked procedural safeguards_ ... But the Miranda
Court simply did not perceive judicial inquiries and custodial
interrogation as equivalents: "[T]he compulsion to speak in
the isolated setting of the police station may well be greater
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A number of state supreme courts have accepted this
invitation and imposed restrictions on police interrogation procedures. For example, several courts_have rejected the impeachment exception to Miranda on state law
grounds. See People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal.3d 101, 113,545
P.2d 272, 280, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360, 368 (1976); State v.
Santiago, 53 Hawaii 254, 265-67, 492 P.2d 657, 664-65
(1971); Commonwealth v. Triplett, 462 Pa. 244, 249, 341
A.2d 62, 64 (1915). Similarly, the California Supreme
Court has rejected Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96
(1975), and held that an accused's invocation of the right
to-silence bars police from subjecting him again to custodial interrogation, even for another crime .. People v.
Pettingill, 21 Cal.3d 231, 248-49, 578 P.2d 108, 118-19, 145
Cal. Rptr. 861,871-72 (1978). In Commonwealth v. Bussey,

after Miranda. One commentator has written that
Massiah "was apparently lost in the shuffle of fast-moving events that reshaped constitutional-criminal procedure in the 1960s." Y. Kamisar, Police Interrogation and
Confession 160 (1980). In 1977, however, the Court revived Massiah and again applied the right to counsel to
exclude a confession.
In Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977), a murder defendant surrendered and was being returned to Des
Moines, Iowa, when he made incriminatory statements.
During this trip a detective gave what has become known
as the "Christian Burial" speech, in which he pointed out
that weather conditions might make discovery of the victim's body impossible and that the "parents of this little
girl should be entitled to a Christian burial of the little
giri ...." id. at 393. The Court heid that "once adversary
proceedings have commenced against an individual, he
has a right to legal representation when the government
interrogates him." /d. at 401.
In 1980 the Court again relied on the right to counsel in
United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), and ruled
statements obtained in a "jail plant" case inadmissible
on Sixth Amendment grounds. In Henry the defendant
was held pending trial after being indicted for bank .robbery. The police contacted an inmate who had been a
government informant and instructed him to be alert to
any statements made by several federal prisoners but not
to initiate any conversation with or question Henry regarding the bank robbery. The Court held that statements made by Henry to the informant violated the right
to counsel.
The Sixth Amendment line of cases differs from Miranda in a number of respects and offers an independent
vehicle to suppress confessions. As one court has noted:
"The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is analytically
distinct from the Fifth Amendment right created by Miranda." United States v. Karr, 742 F.2d 493, 495 (9th Cir.
1984). The right to counsel analysis raises two issues:
first, when does the right attach, and second, when have
the police "deliberately elicited" an incriminatory state- ·
ment.

486 Pa. 221, 230,404 A.2d 1309, 1314 (1979), the Penn=

sylvania Supreme Court rejected North Carolina v. Butler
on state constitutional grounds.
In at least one case, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on
state grounds in resolving a confession issue. Ohio v.
Gallagher, 425 U.S. 257 (1976), involved an in-custody
parolee who was questioned by his parole officer without
being informed of his Miranda rights. The U.S. Supreme
Court, however, did not resolve the issue. Instead, the
case was remanded"to determine whether the Ohio
Supreme Court rested its decision upon the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, or Art. 1, § 10, of the Ohio Constitution, or
both." /d. at 259. On remand, the Ohio Supreme Court reaffirmed its prior decisions, which required warnings, on
state constitutional grounds. State v. Gallagher, 46 Ohio
St. 2d 225, 348 N.E. 2d 336 (1976).
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

In 1964 the Supreme Court explicitly relied, for the first
time, on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to exclude
a confession. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964), the defendant made a statement to an accomplice after he had been indicted, retained counsel, and
released on bail. Unknown to Massiah, his accomplice
had agreed to cooperate with the police. The Court held
that Massiah's Sixth Amendment rights had been violated because the police had "deliberately elicited" incriminatory statements after the right to counsel had
attached. /d. at 206. Shortly after this decision, the Court
decided Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Again,
the Court relied on the right to counsel to suppress a
confession.

Attachment of Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence." Accordingly, the
threshold inquiry is when a "criminal prosecution"
commences. In Massiah, the progenitor of this line of
cases, the defendant had been indicted and thus the
Court readily found that the right to counsel had already
attached at the time the statement was made. In Brewer
v. Williams the defendant had not yet been indicted and
the Court nevertheless found that the right to counsel
had attached. According to the Court:

Miranda was decided in 1966 and changed the focus
of analysis to the Fifth Amendment. For the next decade,
Sixth Amendment issues remained dormant. In later
decisions, the Court emphasized that Escobedo had
been displaced by Miranda. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S.
682, 687 (1972) ("prime purpose of Escobedo was not to
vindicate the constitutional right to counsel as such, but,
like Miranda, to guarantee full effectuation of the privilege against self-incrimination."); United States v.
Gouveia, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2298 n. 5 (1984) ("we have
made clear that we required counsel in Miranda and
Escobedo in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination rather than to vindicate
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.").

There can be no doubt in the present case that judicial
proceedings had been initiated against Williams before the
start of the automobile ride from Davenport to Des Moines. A
warrant had been issued for his arrest, he had been
arraigned on that warrant before a judge in a Davenport
courtroom, and he had been committed by the court to
confinement in jail. /d. at 399.

In recognizing that the right to counsel attached sometime before indictment, Williams followed earlier cases
involving the Sixth Amendment in lineup situations. See

The Massiah decision, however, was mostly forgotten

5

Kirbyv.ci!Hnois,"406U.S.682,689 (1972) (judicial .
proceedings commence with the "formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment");
Moorewlllinois, 434 U.S. 220,228 (1977) (prosecution
commenced when "the victim's complaint was filed in
court.").
The precise point in a criminal case at which the Sixth
Amendment is triggered, however, is unclear. The
Court's later confession cases do not address this issue.
In United States v. Gouveia, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 2297-300
(1984), the defendants argued that the right to counsel
had attached to prisoners in administrative segregation.
Since even the initial stages of a criniinan)rosec:ution
had not yet commenced, the Court rejected this argument. In both United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980),
and Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454; 469-70 (1981), the
defendants had been indicted and the right to counsel
clearly had attached.

Williams is illustrative, although the Court decided only
the Sixth Amendment issue in that case.

"Deliberately Elicit" Test
Once the right to counsel has attached, it still must be
determined what type of police conduct violates the right.
In Massiah the Court held that the Sixth Amendment
prohibits law enforcement officers from "deliberately elicit[ing]" incriminating statements once the right attached.
One initial problem is determining whether "deliberate
elicitation" under the Sixth Amendment is the same as
"interrogation" under Miranda. Although the Court
seemed to.equate interrogation and deliberat~ elicitation
in Brewer, later cases have distinguished the two terms.
In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), the Court
wrote in a footnote:
There is language in the opinion of the Rhode Island
Supreme Court in this case suggesting that the definition of
"interrogation" under Miranda is informed by this Court's
decision in Brewer v. Williams . ... This suggestion is erroneous .... The definitions of "interrogation" under the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments, if indeed the term "interrogation" is
even apt in the Sixth Amendment context, are not necessarily interchangeable, since the policies underlying the two
constitutional protections are quite distinct. /d. at 300 n.4.

Considered together, the Court's Sixth Amendment
confession and lineup cases provide some guidance.
Under Kirb~ an arrest alone does nottrigger the right to
counsel. See United States v. Muzychka, 725 F.2d 1061,
1068 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 2390 (1984). On the
other hand, it is clear that the right to counsel attaches by
the time of a preliminary hearing. Moore v. Illinois, 434
U.S. 220, 228 (1977). Moreover, Brewer v. Williams establishes'that the right to counsel attaches even earlier than
the preliminary hearing, although it is not clear exactly
when. The lower courts are divided on whether a
complaint and/or arrest warrant triggers the right to counsel. The Supreme Court has declined to decide this
issue. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 480 n.7
(1~§11-:..~QIJie 99Jlf't§ b~Y~ ,!:JeldJt!at iwdicial proceedings
commence with the filing of a complaint. E.g., People v.
Curtis, 132111~ App.3d241, 476 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (1985).
Other courts have heT<ftfiat ani.Jnexecutei::l arrest warrant
does not trigger judicial proceedings. United States v.
Reynolds, 762 F.2d 489, 493 (6th Cir. 1985).

In other words, interrogation would qualify as deliberate
elicitation but so would other police conduct. This point is
illustrated by United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980),
in which the Court found a Sixth Amendment violation
where the police requested a jail informant, pursuant to a
contingent fee arrangement, to be alert to any statements
made by the defendant. Even without interrogation, the
right to counsel was violated: "By intentionally creating a
situation likely to induce Henry to make incriminating
statements without the assistance of counsel, the
Government violated Henry's Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.'' /d. at 274. See also McCubbin v. State, 675 P.2d
461 (Okla. Grim. App. 1984) (fact that the private detective who was planted in jail did not question accused is
immaterial) (listing other cases).

Similarly, courts are split over whether an initial
appearance triggers the right to counsel. Compare Ross
v. State, 254 Ga. 22, 326 S.E.2d 194, 200 (initial appearance does not trigger right to counsel), cert. denied, 105
S.Ct.3490 (1985), with People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39,
365 N.W.2d 56, 62 (1984) (initial arraignment triggers
right), cert. granted sub nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 105
S.Ct. 2654 (1985). Brewerv. Williams seems to indicate
that the right to counsel has attached by this time, since
one of the factors mentioned by the Court was the defendant's arraignment.

Recent Cases
This term the Court has decided to review two cases
that may provide a vehicle for clarifying some of these
issues. The first case, Maine v. Moulton, 106 S.Ct. 477
(1984), was decided in December. In that case, Moulton
and a codefendant were indicted for theft. Unknown to
Moulton, his codefendant confessed to the pqlice and
agreed to be a prosecution witness. The police placed a
body wire transmitter on the codefendant when he was
scheduled to meet Moulton to discuss defense strategy
for their coming trial. Part of their discussion concerned
the elimination of witnesses, a subject which Moulton
had raised earlier. Moulton's incriminating statements
concerning the pending theft charges were admitted at
his trial. The Court held that Moulton's right to counsel
had been violated: "[T]he Sixth Amendment is violated
when the State obtains incriminating statements by
knowingly circumventing the accused's right to have
counsel present in a confrontation between the accused
and a state agent." /d. at 487. The fact that the police
were investigating a different crime- the intimidation or
elimination of witnesses- did not change the result.
According to the Court, the police's obligation to investigate other crimes could not be used to violate the defen-

Although there is some uncertainty about the exact
time at Which the right to counsel attaches, it is clear that
this inquiry is very different from the Miranda issue of
"custodial interrogation." Sweat v. Arkansas, 105 S.Ct.
933 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (lower court found that right to counsel had not
attached because the accused was not under arrest or
deprived of his freedom). Custody under Miranda clearly
occurs with an arrest but an arrest alone does not trigger
the right to counsel. Moreover, once a defendant is indicted and released on bail, he is no longer in custody and
yet the right to counsel has attached. This was the situation in Massiah. There are, of course, times when both
Miranda and the right to counsel would apply. Brewer v.
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dant's right to counsel for pending charges.
In the second case, Henderson v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 741
(2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 3499 (1985), an
informant was placed in the defendant's cell and instructed to listen for helpful information. The cell overlooked
the parking garage where the murder took place. The
Second Circuit held that the police deliberately elicited
incriminatory statements in violation of the right to counsel. /d. at 744-45.

sel ... means at least that a person is entitled to the help
of a lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings
have been initiated against him ...." 430 U.S. at 398.
The Court's action in McLeod v. Ohio, 381 U.S. 356
(1965), also supports this view. In McLeod the police
obtained a statement from an indicted defendant who
was not represented by counsel. The Court vacated the
judgment and remanded the case "to the Supreme Court
of Ohio for consideration in light of Massiah v. United
States . ..."Mcleod v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 582 (1964). On
remand, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the conviction
by distinguishing Massiah on the grounds that McLeod
"was not then represented by counsel and had not even
requested counsel." State v. McLeod, 1 Ohio St.2d 60,
62, 203 N.E.2d 349, 351 (1964). The case went back to
the U.S. Supreme Court, which, citing Massiah, reversed
per curiam. The Court's later cases demonstrate that
McLeod is still good law: "[l]n McLeod v. Ohio, ... we
summarily reversed a decision that the police could elicit
information after indictment even though counsel had not
yet been appointed." Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477,
484 n.8 (1981). See also Sweat v. Arkansas, 105 S.Ct.
933, 937 (1985) (Marshall, J. dissenting from denial of
certiorari).

Waiver
There is disagreement over whether the Sixth Amendment imposes a greater and different standard for waiver
than that imposed by Miranda. Several al!thorities argue
that it does. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 53 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) ("a suspect may waive his Fifth
Amendment to remain silent without waiving his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel."). See also People v.
Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56, 62-70 (1984), cert.
granted sub. nom. Michigan v. Jackson, 105 S.Ct. 2654
(1985); Note, Proposed Requirements tor Waiver of the
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
363 (1982).
Courts have adopted three distinct positions on the
issue. First, some courts hold that the standard for waiving the right to counsel and Miranda are the same. See
United States v. Woods, 613 F.2d 629, 634 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 920 (1980); Jordan v. Watkins, 681 F.2d
1067, 1075 (5th Cir. 1982). At the other extreme, the
Second Circuit has held that not only is the Miranda waiver test insufficient for Sixth Amendment purposes but
that the waiver must be obtained by a judicial officer.
United States v, Mohabir, 624 F.2d 1140, 1152-53 (2d Cir.
"1980) (under supervisory authority). Still other circuits
have taken an intermediate position. See United States v.
Karr, 742 F.2d 493, 496 (9th Cir. 1984) (informed of right to
counsel and commencement of judicial proceedings).

DERIVATIVE EVIDENCE
The exclusionary rule applies not only to primary
evidence obtained as a direct result of unconstitutional
conduct but also to evidence later discovered and found
to derive from that conduct. Secondary or derivative
evidence is often referred to as "fruit of the poisonous
tree." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
The genesis of this rule is Silverthorne Lumber Co. v.
United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), where the Court
wrote: "The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court
but that it shall not be used at all." /d. at 392. Nevertheless, from the beginning the Court has recognized exceptions to the derivative evidence rule. Initially, the Court
commented that evidence derived from an independent
untainted source was admissible. Later, the Court recognized a second exception, known as the attenuation rule.
Thus, even in the absence of an independent source,
secondary evidence may be admissible if the "causal
connection ... may have become so attenuated as to
dissipate the taint." Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S.
338, 341 (1939). Recently, the Court recognized a third
exception- the inevitable discovery rule. Nix v.
Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984).

Impeachment
Another area in which the Sixth Amendment and
Miranda may differ concerns the impeachment exception. As noted earlier, an accused may be impeached
with a statement obtained in violation of Miranda. Whether this impeachment exception applies in the right to
counsel context is unclear. Several courts have refused
to recognize such an exception. The defendant in United
States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 590 (2d Cir. 1983), was
questioned by the police after he had been indicted and
an hour before his arraignment, at which time counsel
would have been appointed. The court found that this
interrogation violated the Sixth Amendment since the
indictment triggered his right to counsel. The prosecution, citing the impeachment exception to Miranda,
argued that the statement was nevertheless admissible
for impeachment. The court rejected the argument,
distinguishing the right to counsel and Miranda. See also
Bishop v. Rose, 701 F.2d 1150, 1157 (6th Cir. 1983).

In confession cases, two distinct derivative evidence
issues may arise: (1) where secondary evidence is
derived from an illegally obtained confession, and (2)
where the confession is the fruit of some other constitutional violation, such as an illegal search or seizure.
Confession as the Poisonous Tree

Appointment of Counsel
The defendants in Williams and Massiah had retained
counsel at the time they made incriminatory statements.
Nevertheless, the right to counsel does not depend on
whether counsel has been retained or appointed; the
issue is whether the defendant was entitled to counsel. In
Williams the Court commented: "[T]he right to coun-

Inevitable Discovery
In Nix v. Williams, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (1984), the Court for
the first time explicitly recognized the inevitable discovery exception. This case involved the retrial of Brewer v.
Williams, in which Williams' statement given in response
to the Christian Buria1 Speech had been suppressed on
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ri{lhtl0tounseFgrotJfids.·ln a footnote; the CotJrt raised
the possibility that evidence concerning the victim's body
might be admissible at a retrial, even though the body
was found as a result of the confession:

faCt may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a
rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his
rights. /d. at 1296 (emphasis added).

Confession as Fruit of the Poisonous Tree
The derivative evidence doctrine also applies when a
confession is the product of an illegal search or seizure.
In this situation, the confession is the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Court has decided several cases involving
this issue. Here, the issue is whether the connection between the Fourth Amendment violation and the confession had been dissipated or attenuated.
· AfrestecrwitliaUt~pn:>b·able cause, the defendant in
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), was taken to the
police station. After receiving Miranda warnings, he
made two separate statements which implicated !Jim in a
murder. The state court held that the Miranda warnings
automatically purged the confession of the taint of the illegal arrest. The Supreme Court rejected this argument:

Wbi!e neither Williams' incriminating statements themselves nor any testimony describing his having led the police tp the victim's body can.constitutionally be admitted into
evidence, evidence of where the body was found and of its
condition might well be admissible on the theory that the
body would have been discovered in any event, even had .
incriminating statements not been elicited from Williams.
430 U.S. at 407 n.12.

Thus, it was notsurprising that the prosecution attempted to introduce evidence of the condition of the body, articles and photographs of the victim's clothing, and medical and chemical tests on the body at the retrial. The
prosecution's theory was that a search for the body,
which had been terminated when it was learned that
Williams had led the police to the body, would have found
the body in any event. The 200-person search party
stopped two and a half miles from the place where the
body was located.
The Supreme Court endorsed this argument, finding
that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule did not
require suppression in this context: "If the prosecution
can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
the information ultimately or inevitably would have been
discovered by lawful means- here the volunteers'
search- then the deterrence rationale has so little basis
that the evidence should be received. 104 S.Ct. at 2509.
Based on the record, the Court concluded that the prosecution had satisfied this burden and the evidence was
therefore· admissible.

[T]he Miranda warnings, alone and per se, cannot always
make the act [of confessing] sufficiently a product of free will
to break, for Fourth Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession. They cannot assure in every case that the Fourth Amendment violation has not been unduly exploited .... The question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun
must be answered on the facts of each case ... The Miranda warnings are an important factor, to be sure, in determining whether the confession is obtained by exploitation of an
illegal arrest. But they are not the only factors to be considered. The temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances, ... and,
particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct are all relevant. /d. at 603-04.

1:

Applying these factors, the Court concluded that Brown's
confession had not been purged of the taint of the illegal
arrestbecause (i) the statement was obtained shortly
after the arrest (within two hours), (2) no intervening
events such as presentment to a magistrate, consultation
with an attorney, or release from custody had occurred,
and (3) the arrest had a "quality of purposefulness"- its
"impropriety ... was obvious." /d. at 605. Accordingly, the
confession was inadmissible.
In subsequent cases, the Court has applied the Brown
factors, although with varied results. See Dunaway v.
New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979) (Miranda warnings insufficient attenuation); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980) (attenuation found); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S.
687 (1982) (no attenuation); Lanier v. South Carolina, 106
S.Ct. 297 (1985).

Attenuation
The attenuation exception..to.the.derivative evidence
rule differs from the inevitable discovery rule. With this
exception, the evidence is "tainted" but the causal connection, for some reason, has been dissipated or attenuated. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The principal issue in this context is whether a second
confession obtained after an initial tainted confession is
admissible. In United States v. Bayer, 331 U.S. 532 (1947),
the Court had written:
[A]fter an accused has once let the cat out of the bag by
confessing, no matter what the inducement, he is never
thereafter free of the psychological and practical disadvantages of having confessed. He can never get the cat back in
the bag. The secret is out for good. In such a sense, a later
confession always may be looked upon as fruit of the first.
/d. at 540.

Bayer, however, predated Miranda and the Court in Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (1985), found a distinction
between coerced confessions and confessions obtained
in violation of Miranda. This distinction, according to the
Court, makes the subsequent reading of Miranda warnings sufficient attenuation in virtually all cases.
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We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or
improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere
fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does
not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent
administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has
given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should
suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of
the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of
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